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Strategic Channel Design
Abstract
When choosing distribution channels, companies need to rely on design principles that are aligned with their
overall competitive strategy.
Accelerating technological change, heightened marketplace demands, more aggressive global competition,
and shifts in the workforce and population demographics are affecting distribution channels, forcing
companies to reconsider fundamental assumptions about how they reach their markets. The magnitude of
change demands a strategic perspective that views channel decisions as choices from a continually changing
array of alternatives for achieving market coverage and competitive advantage — subject, of course, to the
constraints of cost, investment, and flexibility. Tactical responses, based on maintaining power balances,
managing conflicts, and minimizing transaction costs to pursue greater efficiency, will not suffice.
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Accelerating technological change, heightenedmarketplace demands, more aggressive globalcompetition, and shifts in the workforce and
population demographics are affecting distribution
channels, forcing companies to reconsider fundamen-
tal assumptions about how they reach their markets.
The magnitude of change demands a strategic per-
spective that views channel decisions as choices from a
continually changing array of alternatives for achieving
market coverage and competitive advantage — subject,
of course, to the constraints of cost, investment, and
flexibility. Tactical responses, based on maintaining
power balances, managing conflicts, and minimizing
transaction costs to pursue greater efficiency, will not
suffice. 
Changes in distribution channels come slowly, part-
ly because the inherent complexity of the many links
that connect value-adding functions in a channel ob-
scures the need for change. Distribution channels are
also dauntingly rigid and stable because of powerful,
persistent inertia. Faint-hearted managers, unwilling to
disrupt existing channels and incur predictable short-
run costs for less certain gains from a new configura-
tion or approach, may become discouraged, resulting
in a growing mismatch between the firm’s overall strat-
egy and its means of distribution. Our main premise is
that the pressures for change are overcoming the inertia
in distribution channels. Customary and comfortable
incremental approaches cannot cope. 
Frequently, a firm’s distribution method is an ap-
pendage to its strategy — the result of opportunistic,
reactive, one-by-one decisions accumulated over time
and frozen by perceived barriers. Instead, the firm’s
overall strategic direction must guide changes in chan-
nels. Therefore, we propose a process for incorporating
a strategic perspective into decisions on the future con-
figuration of channel functions, control of the func-
tions, and resource commitments. This process requires
firms to assess their current channels, identify alterna-
tives based on creative combinations of value-adding
channel functions, and evaluate the alternatives within
a broad context that highlights potential competitive
advantages.
First, we outline some forces for change in distribu-
tion channels. Next, we examine the implications of
these changes for channels, including changing com-
mitments, vertical compression, horizontal diversity,
and the need to re-examine channel alliances. We also
suggest how to design channels strategically.
Forces for Change
In the face of inertia, tradition, entrenched industry
practice, and a lack of alternatives, most firms stayed
with their established channels and seldom changed
the way they exercised control.1 Three forces are now
changing the customary rules of channel management:
(1) proliferation of customers’ needs, (2) shifts in the
balance of channel power, and (3) changing strategic
priorities. Channels have become dynamic webs, com-
prising many direct and indirect ways to reach and
serve customers.2
Proliferation of Customers’ Needs
When markets are simple and stable, the appropriate
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principles that are aligned with their
overall competitive strategy and 
performance objectives.
channel configuration is usually evident. Firms will
distribute directly when they want to closely control
selling, serving, and pricing or have only a few readily
identifiable customers. When the market requires a
variety of related goods in small quantities, companies
prefer to use intermediaries because of their wide
coverage (due to economies of scope and scale), expe-
rience, and specialized distribution in their industries.
Theoretically, the higher the required investments in
specialized assets for servicing the end customer, the
more appropriate are direct channels.3 However, these
guidelines for channel configurations are obscured
when markets are fragmented into segments so diverse
that many products are mass customized.4 Three factors
contribute to mass customization and, hence, market
fragmentation:
Expanding capabilities for addressability and variety.
Firms have greater ability to address individually each
customer or small subsegment of their market with a
combination of database technology5 and flexible man-
ufacturing.6 Now firms can engage in a direct dialogue
with their customers and appreciate the diversity of
their needs.
Channel diversity. Increasingly, firms are shifting
from centralized batch production to localized, one-
at-a-time production. Meanwhile, distributors, not
just manufacturers, are exploiting the generic capabil-
ities for addressability and variety to automate many
functions, such as order receipt, shipping, inventory
management, and stock replenishment, so they can
respond to orders more rapidly and cheaply and cus-
tomize products.7 The net result is continuing turmoil
and channel diversity.8
Customer expectations. Customers have become ac-
customed to the benefits of customized products and
greater services, ready availability through their pre-
ferred channel, and rapid order fulfillment.9 Thus cus-
tomers increasingly demand improved performance
that is based on what they now know is possible.
In short, the new ability to address customers in
small groups encourages channel diversity. Address-
ability and diversity together raise customer expecta-
tions. And these expectations put further strain on
distribution channels.
Shifts in the Balance of Channel Power
Few businesses that reach their markets indirectly are
exempt from intermediaries’ seemingly inexorable
gains in power and control. In retailing, this is evident
in the growth of high-volume chain retailers (for ex-
ample, Toys ‘R’ Us now controls 25 percent of the toy
market in the United States), the consolidation among
retailers that reduces the number of direct competitors,
and the emergence of buying groups that permit small
stores (notably in hardware) to improve their buying
power. There have been comparable gains by large
multilocation distribution firms at the expense of small,
local distributors.10
The increased concentration of channel structures has
adverse effects on suppliers’ profitability. All the ele-
ments underlying buyers’ power in the Porter industry-
forces model — enhanced bargaining power, more
knowledgeable buyers, and credible threats of back-
ward integration — favor the intermediaries or end
buyers.11
Enhanced bargaining power. When there are a few
customers making large-volume purchases, the suppli-
ers’ ability to withstand pressures for discounts, price
concessions, and costly services erodes quickly. The
pressures mount when the retailers or distributors face
slim profit margins relative to the suppliers. For exam-
ple, in the United States, grocery retailers with margins
of 1 to 2 percent are turning to manufacturers that
have margins of 10 to 15 percent to bargain for some
of that value. They not only have become more effec-
tive but also are designing their own merchandising
programs and demanding supplier participation to un-
derwrite these programs. They have also demanded
that suppliers cater to the differences in their stores
and in customer profiles. 
The net result of power shifts is not always evident.12
Although many observers believe that manufacturers
have lost ground to suppliers, analysis reveals that both
manufacturers and retailers have lost power to the
consumer.
More knowledgeable buyers. A major determinant of
marketing power has always been the agents’ level of
knowledge.13 Big resellers enhance their relative power
by increasing their knowledge of: (1) their suppliers’
costs — because they may be negotiating to buy pri-
vate-label products from these same suppliers, (2) their
own operations — by taking advantage of transaction
processing systems that can capture and interpret sales
data about each item and merge it with cost informa-
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tion, and (3) their customers’ needs. For example,
Merck purchased its pharmaceutical distributor,
Medco Containment Services, Inc. In addition to
wider product distribution, Merck management
gained detailed information from Medco’s databases,
which link pharmacies, patients, physicians, third-
party payers, and managed care organizations, that can
guide research and help market new products.14
Credible threats of backward integration. Buyers and
channel intermediaries can further enhance their power
by threatening to take over some of their suppliers’ ac-
tivities or displacing them with their own products.
The supplier knows the profit consequences of reduced
capacity utilization and overhead coverage. Chain retail-
ers’ growth of private-label sales has forced the branded-
goods makers to cut their prices, eliminate slow-mov-
ing brands altogether, and sharply rationalize their
product lines.15 Meanwhile, the increase in chain dis-
tributors’ scale and scope permits them to take over
more of their suppliers’ activities, thereby strengthen-
ing their relationship with the end customer and creat-
ing a disadvantage for the supplier. 
Changing Strategic Priorities
Increasingly, companies are handing off noncritical
activities or functions so they can concentrate on en-
hancing their competitive position. In rationalizing
organizational and channel structures, firms are guid-
ed by: 
1. An emphasis on understanding and responding to
customers’ real requirements in order to deliver supe-
rior value. When activities do not relate to these out-
comes, a firm sees them as superfluous.
2. A willingness to cross artificial boundaries within
the organization and challenge how all activities and
processes that comprise value-adding processes, such
as order fulfillment, are linked.16 Can individual activi-
ties be combined, eliminated, done in parallel, or re-
ordered? Applying the same logic to distribution
means that a firm must make rationalization decisions
at the individual channel function level — not at the
higher level of the channel institution.17
3. An effort to perform activities where they make the
most sense. Any activity that is not pivotal to the strat-
egy can be performed better by another organization.18
Along with rationalizing their activities, firms are ex-
ploring new relationships and alliances with customers,
suppliers, and intermediaries. The resulting networks
or value-adding partnerships are like confederations of
specialists. They are flexible, specialized, and empha-
size interfirm relationships, with a pooling of comple-
mentary skills and resources to achieve shared goals.19
The resulting openness to partnering is producing
new channel collaborations for the sharing of activities
such as order fulfillment, inventory management, dis-
tribution, purchasing, and post-sales service.20 The new
linkages require relationship management skills and
careful negotiations. Both participants must realize
durable mutual benefits in financial terms (through in-
creased revenues or lower costs) or hard-to-quantify
benefits due to risk sharing or the pooling of expertise
and market knowledge. Such mutual benefits are in-
creasingly feasible because of advances in information
technology that have sharply reduced the costs of co-
ordinating and administering transactions between
partners.
Implications for Channels
We can interpret the three forces for change — in-
creasing customer needs, shifts in the balance of power,
and changing strategic priorities — more fundamen-
tally from the vantage points of recent developments in
economic and organizational theory. Most distribution
channels are subject to a combination of shifting pat-
terns of commitment, vertical compression, horizontal
diversity, and functional decomposition.
Shifting Patterns of Commitment
Fewer firms are committed to retaining their vertically
integrated distribution systems. Instead, many firms
have dismantled or downsized their corporate distri-
bution arms and outsourced the functions to third
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Increasingly, companies are handing off noncritical activitiesor functions so they can 
concentrate on enhancing their 
competitive position.
parties. But, rather than shifting to conventional
arm’s-length transactions with traditional distribution
intermediaries (e.g. full-line, full-function distributors),
many firms are experimenting with new arrangements.
Some arrangements make relationships so close that
a customer cannot see the seam between producer and
distributor. Because these arrangements involve sub-
stantial, durable, and irreversible investments on both
sides, they resemble strategic alliances.21 At the same
time, other suppliers have numerous third-party ar-
rangements, thereby diversifying their channels to
match the diverse needs in their markets.22 The result
is a complex collection of potentially overlapping out-
lets, with the potential for channel rivalry and conflict.
Greater turbulence and the attendant uncertainty
erodes the inertial forces that hold firms to their estab-
lished channel systems. Webster notes that the dramat-
ic downsizing and personnel turnover that began in
the 1980s accelerates internal change, simply because
the defenders of the status quo no longer hold their
old positions.23 When ties among key personnel break,
organizational arrangements may change because new
decision makers have different opinions that are not
“clouded by the continuity of experience.” 
Vertical Compression
In traditional vertical channels, firms transferred re-
sponsibility from one layer to the next, like passing the
baton in a relay race. Thus a manufacturer sends a
truckload shipment to a wholesaler, which then breaks
it up and sells to a dealer, which, in turn, stocks the
product and persuades the customer to buy (see Figure
1, option 1). If the product needs after-sales service, the
customer takes it back to the dealer, which maintains
and repairs the product in the field. Even though the
product may pass through several layers in the distribu-
tion system, the customer relies solely on the dealer for
the fulfillment of all channel functions, such as infor-
mation, inventory, and repair.24 Others in the vertical
system have a support role. In this case, the wholesaler
provides a wide assortment of products for the dealer’s
selection, but customers fulfill all their needs (assort-
ment, lot sizes, information, and repair) through the
dealer alone. Manufacturers can gain access to cus-
tomers through alternate channel systems as well —
directly or through representatives or one-step inter-
mediaries such as distributors (options 2 and 3 in Fig-
ure 1). But no matter the system used, the customer
fulfills its channel function requirements mainly from
one source.
A small customer that buys through the dealer
channel might prefer to get technical information di-
rectly from the manufacturer, but, because of the small
lot size of its purchases, it would have to get product
information as part of the local dealer’s distribution
support. The manufacturer would find it too costly
to contact and provide this information directly, and
the customer would find it costlier still to await
product shipment from the factory. Even though the
customer is not fully served by the manufacturer
with regard to “information,” overall, it is still better
to get it from the dealer than not at all. (Of course,
the dealer can also provide other relevant informa-
tion about alternative products.)
Now, innovative IT, direct marketing, database mar-
keting, and variations allow some manufacturers to
contact far-flung, small customers for only a fraction of
the cost of a direct sales call. Computer-aided quick-
shipment systems enable transporters to schedule and
dispatch less-than-truckload orders with about the
same speed and efficiency as full loads. The small cus-
tomer, therefore, may not suffer any inconvenience or
product unavailability. Flexible manufacturing systems
allow suppliers to produce small lots at only a marginal-
ly higher cost than scale-efficient large orders. 
The roles of the intermediary, the distributor, and
the dealer are all evolving. New forms of direct chan-
nels are emerging, and indirect channels are getting
shorter with fewer intermediary layers. The role of
the distributor as buffer between the manufacturer
and the retail dealer is threatened in many markets.
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Figure 1 Traditional Channel Options
Manufacturer
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As channels compress, the role of the master dis-
tributor or the wholesaler is most at risk (see Figure
2). With quick-shipment distribution logistics, retail-
ers no longer lose time in ordering directly from the
supplier. And, with the amount of information avail-
able to the supplier, tracking and responding to retail-
level orders is vastly more manageable. IT and quick-
shipment logistics have greatly diminished the need
for dual inventories in the pipeline. In an intensely
competitive environment, the extra margin saved at
the master-distributor level can become a price advan-
tage at the customer level — or can fund efforts to dif-
ferentiate the retailer’s offering.25 For example, with
more than 300 stores selling about 40,000 SKUs
(stock-keeping units), W.W. Grainger has forced a re-
orientation in the electrical goods industry. Both the
seller and the dealer see the master distributor as un-
wanted fat in the system. Home Depot in the con-
struction industry and Terminix and Orkin in the
pest-control industry are further examples.
Ironically, in many industries, manufacturers with-
out the inventory-carrying capacity, the geographic
reach, or the capability to fulfill small orders set up
master distributors as the essential conduit to retail dis-
tribution. But retail dealers have become larger and
more sophisticated in handling both suppliers and cus-
tomers. For small retail dealers, which still need extra
support in product assortment or credit, master dis-
tributors may be the only alternative. But only those
that proactively use advances in information and logis-
tics technology to their advantage and combine them
with excellent servicing of small orders will survive.
Those suppliers that have successfully used a master-
distributor channel in the past will find it hard to by-
pass this level. Master distributors perform inventory
and credit functions and own the relationships with
dealer accounts. Newer, more nimble competitors,
however, may choose the cost-efficient alternative of
eliminating the master distributor. Of course, the mas-
ter distributor may make it difficult for an entrant to
gain coverage, but if the entrant succeeds, the supplier
with the master-distributor channel will lose revenue,
share, and profits. Then the pressure to change will be
tremendous. However, the long-established suppliers
have entrenched relationships with the master distribu-
tors, and these channel partners will be willing to slice
their margins or increase their channel efforts. 
Horizontal Diversity
All channels drift out of alignment with supplier and
customer needs over time, eventually leading to con-
flict, reevaluation, and change. Now these changes
are occurring so swiftly that there is no time to deter-
mine whether an initial channel design is effective.
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki refer to such an environ-
ment as “high velocity.”26
How should a company manage in a high-velocity
environment? New research in strategic decision mak-
ing indicates that the traditional exhaustive and inclu-
sive planning model doesn’t work. Instead, more
effective firms sacrifice thorough planning for experi-
mental action by generating large numbers of options
but not thoroughly analyzing most of them. An ef-
fective firm launches many small experiments or trials,
carefully analyzes only a few options, and reacts quick-
ly to feedback from the experiments. There is no time
for exhaustive forecasting and analysis, and it is diffi-
cult to pin down means-ends relationships and fore-
cast outcomes. Hence, organizations place many small
“bets” and then enlarge those that seem to be most
favorable. In distribution, this means experimenting
with many different ways of reaching the market
(e.g., direct mail, telemarketing, and more traditional
resellers), often simultaneously. 
Placing many small bets may seem indecisive and
irrational, but it is now seen as the first step in a
rational strategy of holding options.27 A strategic
option is a company’s small investment in an opera-
tion that creates the right but not the obligation to
take further action. Options theorists argue that many
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Figure 2 The Role of the Master Distributor
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seemingly small or half-hearted organizational com-
mitments will actually amount to a lot if the commit-
ment keeps a company in the game or is a learning
experience. Because options buy time and knowl-
edge, they are probes; although they may be costly,
they prevent more expensive mistakes and indicate
where to commit resources more heavily.
When is it worthwhile to purchase options? Theo-
rists argue that options are best suited for highly uncer-
tain environments, where investors have difficulty de-
termining an asset’s worth. Therefore, options become
the best way to estimate the worth of a later, larger in-
vestment. Options are valuable in high-growth indus-
tries, in particular, because uncertainty suggests oppor-
tunity, which suggests making investments — but
initial investment decisions are difficult to make ratio-
nally. Options are even more valuable when they can’t
be imitated quickly or easily and provide lead time
over competitors.
Turbulent environments make it difficult to pre-
dict what type of channel is appropriate. As products
eventually assume accepted configurations, as seg-
ments emerge, and as buyer behavior becomes pre-
dictable, a firm that invested in the wrong channel
configuration will discover that it has miscalculated.
Hence, while firms may find themselves trapped in
an inappropriate delivery system, the best they can
do is to alter their channel systems incrementally to
align them with customer expectations.
Contrast this with the supplier who seeks channel
diversity by generating many options and thoroughly
evaluating a few. That is, the firm does business
through many different distribution entities in many
different ways, thereby creating many openings and
gleaning varied information. As the market clarifies,
the manufacturer can judiciously sell some options
(e.g., sell out a distribution joint venture or liquidate
an equity position in a distributor), fail to exercise
some options (cease distributing through the channel
entity), and call some options (invest in them more
heavily by purchasing equity, injecting resources, or
cultivating commitment). Because channel relation-
ships are very difficult for competitors to duplicate or
match, these options have substantial value.
• Multiple Channels. Multiple channels reflect the
range of channel options available to buyers and sup-
pliers. A buyer of personal computers, for example,
could buy the same model from a direct-mail cata-
logue, a computer superstore, or a specialty store, each
for a different price and service. Ideally, these different
service levels reflect the needs of different buyers. A
consumer who is price sensitive but very knowledge-
able about product features and specifications would
order from a direct-mail catalogue. But the customer
who seeks a great deal of product information and ed-
ucation might prefer a computer specialty store. Addi-
tionally, this customer would need the reassurance,
hand-holding, and local service of the specialty store. 
Unfortunately, consumers do not come neatly seg-
mented into such airtight compartments. There is
considerable movement between segments and across
purchases. Moreover, with accelerating product life
cycles, proliferation of products, and fragmentation
of customer segments, multiple channel approaches
are often the only way to provide market coverage.
Different customers with different buying behaviors
will seek channels that best serve their needs.
But options are not a perfect solution. Customers
can infiltrate from the adjoining segments by patron-
izing both the full-service channel and the low-price
channel (see Figure 3). As long as higher price fairly
reflects higher service, customers will be loyal to a
particular channel, but if the service is unnecessary or
can be obtained at a lower cost, customers will cross
to the low-price channel. In some businesses, presales
service is a public good that customers can avail them-
selves of without making a purchase. For example, a
customer can get a full-function demonstration at a
computer specialty store and then buy the product
from a low-cost mail-order retailer. The customer gets
a free ride on the full-service channel.
In managing multiple channels, companies demar-
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As environments stabilize, distribution arrangementsshould become fewer,
more substantial, and more stable,
and reflect a coherent, articulated
channel strategy.
cate products and models by channels, thus min-
imizing direct comparison. The demarcations, of
course, work only when there are meaningful dif-
ferences among products. Sometimes, despite
product differences, competing channels can
offer similar problem-solving capabilities by
patching or bundling products appropriately, for
example, personal computers for workstations. In
such cases, a company can render the patched so-
lution uncompetitive in price. Other coordina-
tion mechanisms, such as joint incentives or cus-
tomer partitioning, work only when one channel
member is supplier-owned (e.g., has its own
salesforce or captive distribution). The supplier-
owned part of the channel can absorb the negative con-
sequences of the mechanisms, if the systemwide results
are worth the cost. But such mechanisms rarely work
when all the multiple members are independent.
Multiple channels are most prevalent in fast-
changing market environments. When the product-
market matures slowly, the channel has time to adapt
to changes in customer-buying patterns. Even if
multiple channels are necessary to reflect market plu-
rality, each channel is clearly specialized to serve a spe-
cific buying pattern. Crossovers are less common. Dis-
count stores in the late 1970s and early 1980s were
clearly targeted to the value-conscious shopper, and
the service-conscious shopper continued to patronize
the specialty stores. The two channels often stocked,
displayed, and sold different brands and attracted a
very different clientele. This does not occur in the
more dynamic industries. Computer models that start
out in specialty stores end up with the catalog retailers
in less than six months. Early buyers may not face
channel dissonance, but late-comers always do. While
later buyers may seek the service of a specialty outlet,
the price of a discount outlet is too tempting to pass
up. Moreover, in dynamic environments, customers’
shopping and buying behaviors, buying criteria, and
segments change frequently. 
In coping with turbulence, channel diversity pays,
but only if the arrangements are treated as options.
Further, they must decide what to do with options as
the market stabilizes. Bowman and Hurry point out
that a bundle of options allows a firm to persevere
through hard times; their small investments can be
carried while they serve their place-holding and learn-
ing function until the market improves.28 A bundle of
options also allows a firm to move faster, as it recog-
nizes and seizes opportunities. Failing to realize op-
tion values means a firm is merely exploring; it does
not develop ideas, realize opportunities, or develop a
distinctive competence.29 Thus manufacturers should
not seek multiple coverage indefinitely. As environ-
ments stabilize, distribution arrangements should be-
come fewer, more substantial, and more stable, and
reflect a coherent, articulated channel strategy.
Functional Decomposition
Do high-velocity environments favor channel special-
ists at the expense of generalists? Specialists have few
routines and narrow operations; generalists do more
and cover more domains. For example, a value-added
reseller of computer systems that focuses on architec-
tural firms is a specialist. A computer chain selling a
wide range of computer hardware and software for
business and personal use is a generalist because it re-
sells many products to wholesale and retail buyers.
In a high-velocity environment, it is unclear what
to sell, how, and to whom. Specialists are probes of
pieces of the environment; promising pieces warrant
holding a specialist option. Yet, in many ways, the
generalist appears well suited to a high-velocity envi-
ronment. Because it does some of everything, it can
hedge. In the language of organizational ecology, a
generalist has slack or capacity that is not fully used,
which can be redeployed.30 Hence, in this type of
environment, it is useful to have distribution options
with both specialists and generalists. 
What happens if and when the environment stabi-
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Figure 3 Multiple Channels
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lizes? Population ecology theorists argue that the gener-
alist, being a jack of many trades, becomes a master of
none. Surrounded by swarms of varied specialists (a
critical assumption), the generalist watches its market
break into pieces, many of which gravitate to a suitable
specialist. Many specialists, as well as the generalists, will
prove unsuitable (Are architects an appropriate seg-
ment? Is value-added reselling an appropriate func-
tion?) and will exit. Population ecology does not predict
which specialists will survive — only that the survivors
tend to be specialists. When markets stabilize, most of
those options with generalists and many of those with
specialists will be less appropriate in the newly stable
environment. A firm with a portfolio of options will be
able to focus on the most suitable channels.
A firm does better in uncertain environments by
dealing through many specialists because specialists
tend to be focused and, hence, more nimble than the
manufacturer. Further, the specialists have valuable
local knowledge about small market niches. Bucklin
suggests that when consumer demand is varied and
complex, distribution channels will be varied as well.31
The manufacturer cannot acquire as much market
knowledge as many local entities can collectively. It
will be overwhelmed by the task of integrating the in-
formation and making a decision. Hence, it will be
better to deal through many entities and let the mar-
ket sort out which are appropriate.
• Composite Channels. Organizational ecology theo-
ry explains both greater diversity and the increase in
composite channels in which both the supplier and its
channel partners divide up the execution of the chan-
nel functions. The supplier performs some functions
such as sales negotiation and order generation, while
its channel partners deliver physical distribution and
order fulfillment. Other channel members might spe-
cialize in functions such as after-sales service. The
members work together with certain members special-
izing in certain functions (see Figure 4). The differ-
ence between composite and conventional channels is
the horizontal task allocation. A team of channel part-
ners (including the supplier), each specializing in a few
tasks, satisfies the customer’s total needs. In the con-
ventional channel, the hand-offs are vertical; each
member performs the full channel functions that its
immediate customers require.
As we suggested earlier, the trend toward functional
specialization (and therefore horizontal channels) is
driven by customers’ desires to receive products and
services in the most cost- and time-efficient manner.
If channel functions have to be unbundled and
sourced separately, customers, especially large ones,
will be willing to do so.
In the health care industry, there are many such
composites. For example, Becton-Dickinson’s Vacu-
tainer Systems division negotiates directly with all
large hospital buying groups for its blood-collection
needles, syringes, and accessories.32 When the deal is
finalized, Becton-Dickinson signs a contract with the
group and provides a list of authorized distributors.
Becton-Dickinson’s distributors effect the physical dis-
tribution — ordering, storing, and supplying prod-
ucts to the appropriate hospital at the desired time in
required lots. It can do this cost efficiently, given the
plethora of other products it already supplies the hos-
pitals, so order entry and fulfillment costs are incre-
mental. At the same time, the cost containment in the
health care industry makes it attractive for buyers to
negotiate directly on high-volume/high-value orders.
The competitive environment gives suppliers better
control on sales, profits, and market shares as well.
The computer industry also has a rich variety of
composite channels. Value-added resellers (VARs) are
able to tailor solutions for customers in niche markets
(banking, retailing, CAD-CAM, etc.) While VARs
provide the specific knowledge on the software, they
work closely with computer vendors for hardware
equipment and system configuration. Customers need
the hardware and software to be integrated in order to
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Figure 4 Composite Channels
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address their problems, but the channel expertise is
such that it takes two members to find a perfect so-
lution.
With new channel forms come new management
challenges; the biggest is channel compensation.
Because the channel member dealing with the cus-
tomer no longer performs all channel functions, it
cannot expect to receive a traditional margin or com-
mission. Ideally, channel members under the new
system are compensated only for the functions they
perform. But herein lies a catch. All members in the
hybrid system must adequately perform their func-
tional responsibilities for the final sale to occur. If one
member fails, the whole team suffers, unless another
team member fills in. Free riders can abuse their posi-
tion by cutting corners in their responsibilities, and
the most valuable player often has to bear the cost. In
the traditional vertical system, poor performance cor-
related directly with lower sales and therefore lower
margins. 
Composite channels are costly to monitor and ad-
minister and seem to work only in environments
that can afford high channel margins. In low-margin
industries, composite channels seem to work only
for market leaders. Such suppliers usually use their
market clout to influence their hybrid channel part-
ners. Free-riding, for instance, is punishable by loss
of orders. A leading industrial supply company, for
example, calls on many of its accounts directly but
routes all orders through its distribution network —
a classic composite system. It will not choose a free-
riding distributor, however. The company has multi-
ple distributors in the same market area. Those not
playing by the rules are not mentioned warmly
by the salesforce when the order is written. The- 
oretically, the customer could still buy from the free-
rider but will rarely do so because of the influence of
the direct sales channel. 
Unfortunately, for weaker suppliers, the coordina-
tion costs of the composite channel often exceed the
benefits of its functional effectiveness. Such firms
then trade off effectiveness for the simplicity and
functional aggregation of the vertical arrangement.
They may have to rely on full-function distributors
to compete with the specialized composite channels
of the market leaders.
Designing the Channel Strategy
The channel design process is similar to the steps fol-
lowed in developing a competitive strategy.33 The dif-
ference is that the channel supports the overall strategy:
its prime requirement is to enhance effective delivery
of the customer value proposition. In this support
role, the channel must meet the requirements of:
1. Effectiveness — How closely does the channel de-
sign address customers’ stated and unstated require-
ments?
2. Coverage — Can the customer find and appreciate
the value in a firm’s offering?
3. Cost-efficiency — Can the company justify a trade-
off in cost-efficiency to gain greater strategic effective-
ness and coverage because of the multiplier effect that
distribution has on increasing the impact of the other
marketing variables? 
4. Long-run adaptability — Can the channel design
handle possible new products and services and incor-
porate emergent channel forms? 
Assessing the Company’s Situation 
The first step in channel design is to identify the threats,
opportunities, strengths, and weaknesses that will in-
fluence channel performance and viability. A company
should analyze competitor’s shares of existing channels,
the relative profitability of each channel, coverage of
the market served, and the cost of each channel func-
tion. A company must consider likely changes in buy-
ing patterns, potential competitive entrants, long-run
cost pressures, and new technologies such as the Inter-
net or multimedia retail kiosks.
A company should assess what customers are seek-
ing from channels by asking:34
• What service attributes do the target customers value?
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Because the channel memberdealing with the customer nolonger performs all channel
functions, it cannot expect to receive
a traditional margin or commission.
• How can we use the differences in preferences to seg-
ment customers with similar needs?
• How well do the available channels meet the needs
of the segments?
Selecting Alternatives
When a firm is confronted with myriad possibilities,
how should it choose a channel arrangement? It should
rely on strategic design principles, subject to the con-
straints of prior strategic commitments, resource avail-
ability, and rigidities. The principles are consistent with
our theoretical analyses, while recognizing that the
channel strategy must contribute to the business’s over-
all performance objectives.
1. Align channels with the overall competitive strategy, by: 
• Designing channels from the market back, so the
channel activities meet the anticipated requirements
of the target market.
• Creating barriers to competitive response. To do so,
the firm may have to pay the price of locking itself
into an internal operation or into close ties with selected
channel partners, which usually obliges the partner to
lock in a chosen supplier and lock out competing sup-
pliers. 
• Enhancing the delivery of superior customer value.
The choice of a channel is also dictated by whether a
firm elects to compete on operating excellence (e.g.,
by emphasizing reliability and competitive pricing of
standard products and services), customer responsive-
ness (through some variant of mass customization or
business partitioning), or superior performance. Each
strategic thrust reflects the choice of a specific target
segment, with distinct requirements and needs.
2. Decompose and recompose channels into integrated
collections of functions. Channel functions are the basic
building blocks of the design process. While functions
cannot be eliminated, they can be combined creatively
to reduce cost and to improve responsiveness and be
dispersed among several different players. It is essential
to take advantage of advancing IT capabilities to im-
prove system coordination.
3. Invest in learning. Firms in high-velocity environ-
ments, where means-ends relationships are uncertain,
should create a portfolio of options for coping with
inevitable uncertainty. These options enable a firm to
explore channel design by trial and error. Some experi-
ments will fail. However, the costs incurred — even
when there is a failure — should not be viewed as loss-
es but as investments in learning how to understand
and gain access to the market. As the market stabilizes,
the firm should choose particular channels rather than
continue to experiment. 
4. Translate strategic choices into programs, projects,
and near-term plans and establish controls for monitor-
ing channel performance. These controls define the in-
formation collected, standards for performance, and
ways to quickly and graphically compare expectations
with results. Without this information, there is no
basis for learning, correcting mistakes, and adjusting
assumptions to better fit reality. Thus the end of this
step signals the beginning of another cycle in the de-
sign process.
Conclusion
Many firms see distribution as peripheral to their com-
petitive strategy. Increasingly, they have recognized that
benign neglect is risky and wastes opportunities for
competitive advantage. Under pressure from powerful
market trends and technological changes, they are vig-
orously scrutinizing past practices, commitments, and
relationships.
How should firms deal with external forces that
disrupt once-stable patterns of channel commitment,
compress vertical systems, proliferate horizontal
alternatives, while decomposing channels into distinct
functions that are reassembling into new patterns? A
channel design process that follows sound design prin-
ciples is needed to identify and select among the myri-
ad of channel alternatives. Ultimately, a channel strate-
gy is a series of trade-offs and compromises that align
the company’s resources with what it should do to satis-
fy its target customers and stay ahead of competitors. u
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